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Abstract
In thispaper, I maintain that theMarcuse anticipates thepost-
structuralist critiqueofthesubject, that these critiques suggest
that theconcept ofthesubject contains too muchphilosophical
and politicalbaggage, and that we needa reconstructed notion
ofsubjectivity thatMarcuse and theFrankfurtSchool initiated
and enable us to further develop. In drawing on Nietzsche,
Freud, andaesthetic modernism, Marcuse posits a bodily, erotic,
gendered, social, and aestheticized sttbjectivity that overcomes
mind-bodydualism, avoids idealist and rationalistessential-
ism, and is constructed in a specific social milieu and ischal-
lenged to reconstruct itselfand emancipate itselffrom limited
and oppressiveforms. In followingMarcuse's reconstruction of
subjectivity, I'll accordingly, first, offer a re-reading of Eros
and Civilization to demonstrate how it anticipates the
poststructuralist critique of the subject and offers an alterna-
tive conception ofsubjectivity. ThenI pursuesomeofthe con-
tributions to rethinking subjectivity in Marcuse's later writ-
ings, focusing on his notion ofradical subjectivity. A t stake is
developing a reconstructed Marcusean theory ofsubjectivity
which emphasizes the needfor a transformation ofthe affec-
tive dimension, thesensibility, and our very conception ofthe
subject to helpcreate a reconstructed conception ofsubjectivity
for contemporary theoryand toprovideconceptions ofthesub-
jective conditions for radical social change and ofagency in
orderto promote individual and social transformation.
The past two decades have witnessed a relentless philosophical
assault on the concept of the subject, once the alpha and omega
of modern philosophy. Materialists have decried the idealist and
essentialist dimensions of the traditional concept of the subject
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in its various Cartesian, Kantian, and other philosophical forms.
More recently, poststructuralist and postmodern theorists have
attacked the universalizing pretensions of subject discourse, its
positing of a (false) unity, its assuming a centered and grounded
status as a linchpin for philosophical systems or knowledge-claims,
and its transparent self-certainty from Descartes' cogito to
Husserl's phenomenology. Following Nietzsche, post-structur-
alists have seen the subject as an effect of language, constructed
in accord with the forms of grammar (i.e. subject/predicate) and
existing linguistic systems, or, with Deleuze, have privileged the
flux and flow of bodily experience over more idealist concep-
tions of consciousness and the self.
For traditional philosophy, the subject was unitary, ideal, uni-
versal, self-grounded, asexual and the center of the human being
and foundation of knowledge and philosophy, while for the
poststructuralist and postmodern critique the human being is
corporeal, gendered, social, fractured, and historical with the
subject radically decentered as an effect of language, society, cul-
ture, and history. Yet if the construction of the subject in lan-
guage, the social, and nature is the key mark of a poststructuralist
or postmodern conception of the subject, then the Frankfurt
School analyses are not that antithetical to such conceptions. The
entire tradition of critical theory - which draws on Hegel, Marx,
Nietzsche, Freud, and Weber - posits the social construction of
the individual, and Hegel, Nietzsche, and Freud can be read as
providing aspects of theorizing the social construction of the
subject in language. Habermas in particular has followed' this
motif and has attacked the philosophy of the subject while pro-
posing replacing its subject/object model with an ego-alter model
that is based upon the ideal of communicative reason. 1
In this paper:, however, I want to pursue Marcuse's sharp cri-
tiques of the rationalist subject of modern philosophy which he
counterposes to notions of libidinal rationality, eros, and the
aesthetic-erotic dimensions of an embodied subjectivity. Marcuse
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is part of a historicist tradition of critical theory which rej~cts
essentialism and sees subjectivitydeveloping in history, evolving
and mutating, in interaction with specific socio-political condi-
tions. Following Adorno and Horkheimer and the earlier Frank-
furt School tradition, Marcuse also sees dominant forms of sub-
jectivity as oppressive and constraining while chal~e~~ing us t~
reconstruct subjectivity and to develop a new sensibility, quali-
tatively different than the normalized subjectivity of contempo-
rary advanced industrial societies. In p~rticular, ~ar~u.se was
engaged in a life-long search for a revolutlonary ~ubJectl~'lty, for
a sensibility that would revolt against the existing SOCiety and
attempt to create a new one.
Hence, I will argue that Marcuse and the Frankfurt School con-
tribute important perspectives for criticizing the traditional con-
cept of the subject and for rethinking and reconceptualizing sub-
jectivity to develop conceptions potent enough to meet
post structuralist, postmodern, materialist, feminist., and other
forms of critique. Crucially, the assault on the subject has had
serious consequences, for without a robust notion of subject~v­
ity and agency there is no refuge for individual freedom and lib-
eration, no locus of struggle and opposition, and no agency ~or
progressive political transformation: ~or these ~easons, ~heonsts
from diverse camps, including feminists, multiculturallsts, and
poststiucturalists who have had second thoughts about the ~­
too-hasty dissolution of the subject, have attempted to rehabili-
tate the subject, to reconstruct the discourse of subjectivity and
agency, in the light of contemporary critique.
In this paper, I maintain that the Marcuse anticipates the post-
structuralist critique of the subject, that these critiques suggest
that the concept of the subject contains too much philosophical
and political baggage, and that we need a reconstructed notion of
subjectivity that Marcuse and the Frankfurt School initiated and
enable us to further develop. In drawing on Nietzsche, Freud,
and aesthetic modernism, Marcuse posits a bodily, erotic,
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gendered, social, and aestheticized subjectivity that overcomes
mind-body dualism, avoids idealist and rationalist essentialism,
and is constructed in a specific social milieu and is challenged to
reconstruct itself and emancipate itself from limited and oppres-
sive forms. In following Marcuse's reconstruction of subjectiv-
ity, I'll accordingly, first, offer a re-reading of Eros and Ciuiliza-
tion to demonstrate how it anticipates the poststructuralist cri-
tique of the subject and offers an alternative conception of sub-
jectivity. Then I pursue some of the contributions to rethinking
subjectivity in Marcuse's later writings, focusing on his notion
of radical subjectivity. At stake is developing a reconstructed
Marcusean theory of subjectivity which emphasizes the need for
a transformation of the affective dimension, the sensibility, and
our very conception of the subject to help create a reconstructed
conception of subjectivity for contemporary theory and to pro-
vide conceptions of the subjective conditions for radical social
change and of agency in order to promote individual and social
transformation.
Re-Reading Erosand Civilization
In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse draws on Freud to depict the
social construction of the subject in the dramatic clash between
the pleasure principle and the reality principle. For Freud, the
instincts are originally governed by the pleasure principle: they
aim solely at "gainingpleasure; from any operation which might
arouse unpleasantness ("pain") mental activity draws back" (E&C
13). From early on, however, the pleasure principle comes into
conflict with a harsh environment and after a series of disciplin-
ary experiences, "the individual comes to the traumatic realiza-
tion that full and painlessgratification of his needs is impossible"
(E&C13). Under the tutelage of the reality principle, the person
learns what is useful and approved behavior, and what is harm-
ful and forbidden. Inthis way, one develops one's rational facul-
ties, becoming "a conscious, thinking subject, geared to a ratio-
nality which is imposed on him from outside" (E&C 14).
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For Marcuse, then, rationality is a social construct and the sub-
ject is a product of socialexperience. Thus, like.Foucault, Marcuse
sees the subject not as a natural and metaphysical substance, pre-
existing its social gestation, but as a product of societal normal-
ization whereby the individual is subjected to social domination.
According to Marcuse's conception, the reality principle e.n~o.rces
the totality of society's requirements, norms and prohibitions
which are imposed upon the individual from "?ut~ide."This ,pr~­
cessconstitutes for him a thoroughgoing domination of the indi-
vidual by society which shapes thought and behavior, desires
and needs, language and consciousness. InMarcuse's words: "ne~­
ther his desires nor his alteration of reality are henceforth hIS
own: they are now 'organized' by h!s soci~ty. ~~d t~is '~rgani­
zation' represses and transsubstantlates hiS onginal instinctual
needs" (E&C 14-15).
Marcuse employs Freud's theory to produce an acc?unt of ho:,"
society comes to dominate the individual, how SOCial control is
internalized and how conformity ensues. He concludes that
"Freud's individual psychology is in its very essence social psy-
chology" (E&C 16) and repeatedly emphasizes that Freud's psy-
chological categories are historical and political in n~ture~ Hence,
Marcuse boldly fleshes out the "political and sociological sub-
stance of Freud's theory" to develop what I call a critical theory
of socialization. Whereas most theories of socialization stre~s i~s
humanizing aspects by claiming that socializati~nmakes. in?i-
viduals more "human"- and thus legitimate dominant SOCIal in-
stitutions and practices - Freud exposes the repressive content
of Western civilization and the heavy price paid for its "progress."
Although industrialization has resulted in material progres~,
Freud's analysis of the instinctual renunciations and unhappi-
ness it has produced raises the question of whether our form of
civilization is worth the suffering and misery (E&C 3ft). In
Marcuse's view, Freud's account of civilization and its discon-
tents puts in question the whole ideology of progress, productiv-
ity and the work ethic, as well as religion and morality, by "show-
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ing up the repressive content of the highest values and achieve-
ments of culture" (E&C 17).
Thus, Marcuse, like Foucault, stresses the social construction of
the subject and the ways that subjectification is involved in a
process of domination. But whereas Foucault, at one period of
his work, and many poststructuralisrs, call for resistance to domi-
nation, they often have no theoretical resources to construct a
notion of agency that would efficaciously resist repression and
domination.2 For Marcuse, however, there is a "hidden trend in
psychoanalysis" which discloses those aspects of human nature
that oppose the dominant ethic of labor and renunciation, while
upholding "the tabooed aspirations of humanity": the demands
of the pleasure principle for gratification and absence of restraint
(E&C 18). He argues that Freud's instinct theory contains a "depth
dimension" which suggests that our instincts strive for a condi-
tion in which freedom and happiness converge, in which we ful-
fill all our needs, in which the subject strives to overcome repres-
sion and domination. For Marcuse, memory contains images of
gratification and can play a cognitive and therapeutic role in
mental life: "Its' truth value lies in the specific function ofmemory
to preserve promises and potentialities which are betrayed and
even outlawed by the mature, civilized individual, but which
had once been fulfilled in the dim past and which are never en-
tirely forgotten" (E&C 18-19).
Marcuse subtly reformulates the therapeutic role of memory
stressed in psychoanalysis. In Freud's theory, the suppression of
memory takes place through the repression ofunpleasant or trau-
matic experiences, which are usually concerned with sexuality
or aggression; the task of psychoanalysis is to free the patient
from the burden or repressed, traumatic memories - whose re-
pression often produces neurosis - by providing understanding
and insight that would dissolve neurotic behavior. Although
Marcuse preserves the psychoanalytic linkage between forget-
ting and repression, he stresses the liberating potentialities of
6
Marcuse and the Questfor Radical Subjectivity
memory and recollection of pleasurable or euphoric experiences
rather than the unpleasant or traumatic experiences stressed by
Freud. In his reconstruction of Freud, Marcuse suggests that re-
membrance of past experiences of freedom and happiness could
ut into question the painful performances of alienated labor~d manifold oppressions of everyday life.
Marcuse's analysis implies that society trains the individual for
the systematic repression of those ernancipatory memor~es,.and
devalues experiences guided solely by the pleasure prmcIP.I:,
Following Nietzsche in the Genealogy ~f.Mo~als,. ~~c~se cnti-
cizes "the one-sidedness of memory-traimng In civilization: the
faculty was chiefly directed towards re~emberingd~ties rath~r
than pleasures; memory was linked With b~d conscience, gu~t
and sin. Unhappiness and the threat of punishment, not happi-
ness and the promise of freedom, linger in the memory" (E&C
232).
Along with memory, Marcuse suggests that fantasy generates
images of a better life by speaking the language of the pleas~re
principle and its demands for gra~ification. He. stresses t.he im-
portance of great art for liberation beca~se l~ e~bodles the
emancipatory contents of phantasy and the imagmanon through
producing images of happiness and a life without anxiety. In
Marcuse's view, the phantasies in our daydreams and hopes an-
ticipate a better life and embody the eruption of desires for in-
creased freedom and gratification. The unconscious on this ac-
count contains the memory of integral gratification experienced
in the womb, in childhood, and in peak experiences during one's
life. Marcuse holds that the "psychoanalytic liberation of
memory" and "restoration of phantasy" provide access to expe-
riences of happiness and freedom which are subversive of the
present life. He suggests that Freud's theory of human nature,
far from refuting the possibility of a non-repressive civilization,
indicates that there are aspects of human nature that are striving
for happiness and freedom.
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In defending the claims of the pleasure principle, Marcuse be-
lieves that he is remaining true to a materialism which takes seri-
ously material needs and their satisfaction, and the biological
"depth-dimension" of human nature. In his view, defence of the
validity of the claims of the pleasure principle has critical-revolu-
tionary import in that Freud's analysis implies that the human
being can only tolerate so much repression and unhappiness, and
when this point is passed the individual will rebel against the
conditions of repression. Freud's theory thus contains elements
of an anthropology of liberation which analyses those aspects of
human nature that furnish the potential for radical opposition
to the prevailing society.
Marcuse concludes that Freud's theory contains radical implica-
tions that have been covered over, or neglected, and which he
wishes to restore in their most provocative form. He argues that
this requires a restoration of Freud's instinct theory, preserving
his claims for the importance of sexuality and acknowledgment
of its vital and explosive claims. Neo-Freudians who deny the
primacy of sexuality have, in Marcuse's view, repressed Freud's
deep insights into human sexual being by relegating sexual in-
stincts to a secondary place in their theory (E&C 238ff). Marcuse
believes that Freud's theory discloses the depth and power of
instinctual energies which contain untapped emancipatory po-
tential. He describes these instinctual energies which seek plea-
sure and gratification as "Eros." A liberated Eros, Marcuse claims,
would release energies that would not only seek sexual gratifica-
tion, but would flow over into expanded human relations and
more abundant creativity. The released Eros would desire, he
suggests, a pleasurable aesthetic-erotic environment requiring a
total restructuring of human life and the material conditions of
existence.
Now Marcuse also acceptsFreud's concept of Thanatos, the death
instinct, Freud's notion of the political economy of the instincts,
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in which strengthening the life instincts enable Eros to control
and master Thanatos, thus increasing freedom and happiness and
diminishing aggression and destruction. Thus, surprisingly,
Marcuse adopts a rather mechanistic concept of the instincts,
building on Freud's biologistic energy-instinct model - which
has been sharply criticized and rejected both within various circles
of psychoanalytic theory, as well as within c.ritical th~ory
(Haberrnas and his students) and poststructuralism. I believe,
however, that one can construct a Marcusean theory of the sub-
ject without deploying the problematic aspects of Freud's instinct
theory.
The key to this reconstruction of Marcuse's conception of sub-
jectivity is the "Philosophical Interlude" in E&C in which he
develops a critical analysis of the presuppositions of Western ra-
tionality and- its concept of the philosophical subject. Marcuse
claims that the prevalent reality principle of Western civilization
presupposes an antagonism between subjec~ ~~ object, min~
and body, reason and the passions, and the individual and SOCl-
ety. Nature is experienced on this basis as raw material to be
mastered, as an object of domination, as provocation or resis-
tance to be overpowered (E&C 110). The ego in Western thought
is thus conceptualized as an aggressive, offensive subject, fight-
ing and striving to conquer the resistant world. Through labor,
the subject seeks continually to extend its power and control
over nature. The Logos of this reality principle is, Marcuse ar-
gues, a logic of domination that finds its culmination in the re:ti-
ity principle of advanced industrial society, the performance pnn-
ciple. The performance principle is hostile to the senses and re-
ceptive faculties that strive for gratification and fulfillment. It
contains a concept of repressive reason which seeks to tame in-
stinctual drives for pleasure and enjoyment. Its values, which are
the governing norms of modern societies, include:
profitable productivity, assertiveness, efficiency, competi-
tiveness; in other words, the Performance Principle, the rule
of functional rationality discriminating against emotions, a
9
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dual morality, the 'work ethic,' which means for the vast
majority of the population condemnation to alienated and
inhuman labor, and the will to power, the display of
strength, virility (M&F 282).
This hegemonic version of the reality principle has been chal-
lenged, ~arcuse argues, from the beginning of Western philoso-
phy. Against ~he ~tagonistic struggle between subject and ob-
ject, an 0pP~slng l~eal of reconciliation and harmony has been
formulated, In which the individual strives for fulfillment and
gratifi~ation. This 'Logos of gratification,' Marcuse suggests isfo~~d in ~ristotle'snotion of the noustheos and Hegel's ideai of
spint coming to ~est and, fruition in absolute knowledge (E&C
112~f). In thes~ philosophIcal conceptions, the human being is to
attam. a condition of reconciliation after a process of struggle,
suffering and labor, in which alienation and oppression are fi-
nally overcome. Schopenhauer advocates a similar idea of the
r~stless, ever-striving "will" seeking peaceful Nirvana. In addi-
t~on, Marc~se f~.ds a. logi~ of gratification and different concep-
tion. of s~bJectIvI~ym ~Ietzsche's emphasis on the body, the
passions, ~oy an~ hbe~atIon.from time and guilt (E&C119f). The
values affirmed ill this reality principle would be the antithesis
?f the repressive performance principle and its dominating sub-
[ect and would affirm .
receptivity, sensitivity, non-violence, tenderness, and so on.
~hese characte.rist.ic appear indeed as opposites of domina-
non and explolta~lon. On the primary psychological level,
they would pertam to the domain of Eros, they would ex-
press the energy of the life instincts against the death in-
stinct and destructive energy (M&F 284)
This ~lternative~eali~y princi~le a~d conceptio~of subjectivity
als~ fInds expressIOn.m ~reud s notion of the NIrvana principle,
which hol~s that all mstincts aim at rest, quiescence and the ab-
sen~e of paIn (E&C Sff and 124ff). In addition, Marcuse draws on
~chiller's ~onception of aesthetic education and play, arguing that
In aesthetic and erotic experience, play, and fantasy, the conflict
between reason and the senses would be overcome so that "rea-
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son is sensuous and sensuousness rational" (E&C 180). Operat-
ing through the play impulse
the aesthetic function would'abolish compulsion, and place
man, both morally and physically in freedom.' It would
harmonize the feelings and affections with the ideas of rea-
son, deprive the' laws of reason of their moral compulsion'
and 'reconciles them with the interest of the senses' (E&C
182).
In the language of poststructuralism, Marcuse thus envisages an
embodied subjectivity in which the opposition between reason
and the senses, central to the modern philosophical concept of
the subject, is deconstructed. For Schiller and Marcuse, the play
impulse is connected with the aesthetic function which would
mediate between the passive, receptive "sensuous impulse' and
the active creative "form impulse," thus reconciling reason and
the senses. The play impulse aspires to a condition of freedom
from restraint and anxiety, involving "freedom from the estab-
lished reality: man is free when the 'reality loses its seriousness'
and when its necessity 'becomes light" (E&C 187). This "free-
dom to play" and to create an "aesthetic reality" requires libera-
tion of the senses and, as both Schiller andMarcuse called for, "a
total revolution in the mode of perception and feeling" (E&C
189).
The resultant conception of an aestheticized and eroticized sub-
jectivity preserves the connotation of Sinnlichkeit as pertaining
to sensuality, receptiveness, art and eros, thus redeeming the body
and the senses against the tyranny of repressive reason and af-
firming the importance of aesthetics, play, and erotic activity in
human life. Hence, against the rational and domineering subject
of mastery, Marcuse advances a notion of subjectivity as mediat-
ing reason and the senses, as seeking harmony and gratification.
Thus the intersubjective ideal of a libidinal subjectivity is har-
monious and gratifying relations with others and, one might add,
with nature itself. Instead of controlling and dominating objects,
Marcusean subjectivity seeks libidinal andpeaceful relations with
others and with the external world. 11
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Moreover, Marcuse proposes a new concept of reason which he
describes as "libidinal rationality" (E&C 223ft). In this concep-
tion reason is not repressive of the senses but acts in harmony
with them, helping to find objects of gratification and to culti-
vate and enhance sensuality. Marcuse rejects the dominant philo-
sophical paradigm, which sees reason as the distinctly human
faculty and the senses as disorderly, animalic, and inferior. The
concept of reason operative in this model, Marcuse suggests, is
repressive and totalitarian and does not adequately allow for aes-
thetic-erotic gratification and development (E&C 119ff), due to
its embrace of the mind-body split. Marcuse's ideal is a form of
human life in which reason becomes sensuous, protecting and
enriching the life instincts, and whereby the senses help create a
"sensuous order" (E&C 223£f). He assumes that as more restric-
tions are taken away from the instincts and as they freely evolve,
they will seek "lasting gratification" and will structure social re-
lations that will make continual gratification possible. In this
way, "Eros redefines reason in its own terms. Reasonable is what
sustains the order of gratification" (E&C 224). This could make
possible freer, more fulfilling human relations and could create a
social order and community based on freedom, gratification,
cooperation and rational authority. Then, "repressive reason gives
way to a new rationality ofgratification in which reason and hap-
piness converge" (E&C 224).
The New Sensibility, Emancipation, and Revolution: The Late
Marcuse
Hence, against the notion of the rational, domineering subject
of modern theory, Marcuse posits a subjectivity that is evolving,
developing, striving for happiness, gratification, and harmony.
Such subjectivity is always in process, is never fixed or static, and
is thus a creation, an achievement, and a goal and not an absolute
metaphysical entity. Marcusean subjectivity is also embodied,
gendered, oppositional, and struggles against domination, repres-
sion, and oppression, and for freedom and happiness. There is
,12
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thus nothing essentialist, idealist, or metaphysical, her~. Instead,
M se's conception of subjectivity is corporeal, cultivates thearcu · f .
thetic and erotic dimensions of experience, and stnves or gratl-
aes ith h df tion and harmonious relations WIt ot ers an nature.
rca 1·· I fusi d ·Meuse's radical subjectivity is also po mea ,re SIng omina-
tion and oppression, struggling against conditions which block
freedom and happiness.
There is widespread agreement today that we need the discourse
of subjectivity and agency for ethics, for politics, ~d for advanc-
ing the project of human liberation, and I have tried to suggest
that Marcuse's perspectives on subjectivity stand up to ~t .least
aspects of the contemporary P?S~structuralistand other crltlq~es
of the subject, as well as providing resources for recon~t~ctmg
the concept of subjectivity in the contemporary era. It IS Impor-
tant to note that for Marcuse the reconstruction of subjectivity,
the creation of eroticized rationality, and the development of a
free creative self, can only take place through ·practice and the
transformation of social relations and activity. Moreover, Marcuse
is perfectly aware that the existing society is organized precise.ly
to prevent such a reconstruction ?f subjectiv~ty~nd new SO~lal
relations, prescribing instead a regime of domination, autho~lty,
repression, manipulated desublimation and submission. Esp~<:al1y
in ODM, but throughout his work, Marcuse presents a cnuque
of hegemonic forms of subjectivity and domination and a chal-
lenge to overcome the one-dimensional, conformist and normal-
ized subject of advanced industrial society.
Throughout his later writings, Marcuse was vitally concerned to
discover and theorize a "new sensibility," with needs, values, and
aspirations that would be qualitatively different f:o~ s~bjectiv­
iry in one-dimensional society. To create a new subjectivity, there
must be "the emergence and education of a new type of hu~an
being free from the aggressive and repressiv.e needs and ~splr~­
tions and attitudes of class society, human beings created, m soli-
darity and on their own initiative, their own environment, their
13
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own Lebenswelt, their own 'property. '''3 Such a revolution in
needs and values would help overcome a central dilemma in
Marcuse's theory - sharply formulated in One-DimensionalMan
(hereafter ODA!) - that continued to haunt him: "How can the
administered individuals - who "have made their mutilation into
their own liberties and satisfactions... liberate themselves from
themselves as well as from their masters? How is it even think-
able that the vicious circle be broken?" (ODM 250-251).
In order to break through this vicious circle, individuals must
transform their present needs, sensibility, consciousness, values,
and behavior while developing a new radical subjectivity, so as
to create the necessary conditions for social transformation (5L
67). Radical subjectivity for Marcuse practices the "great refusal"
valorized in both E&C and GDM. In E&C (149Q, the "Great
Refusal is the protest against unnecessary repression, the struggle
for the ultimate form of freedom - 'to live without anxiety. '" In
ODM (256f) , h.owever, the Great Refusal is fundamentally politi-
cal, a refusal of repression and injustice, a saying no, an elemen-
tal oppositional to a system of oppression, a noncompliance with
the rules of a rigged game, a form of radical resistance andstruggle.
In both cases, the Great Refusal is based on a subjectivity that is
not able to tolerate injustice and that engages in resistance and
opposition to all forms of domination, instinctual and political.
In the late 1960s,Marcuse argued that emancipatory needs and a
"new sensibility" were developing within contemporary society.
He believed that in the New Left and counterculture there was
the beginnings of "a political practice of methodical disengage-
ment and the refusal of the Establishment aiming at a radical
transvaluation of values" (EL 6) that was generating a new type
of human being and subject. The new sensibility "expresses the
ascent of the life instincts over aggressiveness and guilt" (EL 23)
and contains a "negation of the needs that sustain the present
system of domination and the negation of the values on which
they are based" (5L 67). Underlying the theory of the new sensi-
14
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biliry is a concept of th~ acti~e role of the s~nses in the const~tu­
tion of experience which rejects the Kantian and other philo-
sophical devaluation of the senses as passive, merely receptive.
For Marcuse, our senses are shaped and molded by society, yet
constitute in turn our primary experience of the world and pro-
vide both imagination and reason with its material. He believes
that the senses are currently socially constrained and mutilated
and argues that only an emancipation of the senses and a new
sensibility can produce liberating social change (EL 24££ and
CR&R 62fQ.4
Instead of the need for repressive performance and competition,
the new sensibility posits the need for meaningful work, gratifi-
cation and community; instead of the need for aggression and
destructive productivity, it affirms love and the preservation of
the environment; and against the demands of industrialization,
it affirms the need for beauty, sensuousness, and play, affirming
the aestheti~ and erotic components of experience. The "new
sensibility" translates these values and needs into "a practice that
involves a break with the familiar, the routine ways of seeing,
hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may
become receptive to the potential forms of a non-aggressive, non-
exploitative world" (EL 6). This total refusal of the dominant
societal needs, values and institutions represents a radical break
with the entirety of the society's institutions, culture and life-
style, and supplies prefigurations of a new culture and society.
Of course, Marcuse was disappointed that the new sensibility
did not become the agent of revolution that he sought to replace
the proletariat; he was also dismayed that the New Left and coun-
terculture fell prey to the seductions of the consumer society or
were repressed and disintegrated. In the 1970s, however, he sought
precisely the same values and subjectivity in new social move-
ments, in particular feminism, the environmental movement,
peace movement, and various forms of grass-roots activism which
were eventually described as"new socialmovements." In the 1974
15
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lecture on "Marxism and Feminism," Marcuse notes for the first
time the constitutive role of gender, theorizes the differences
between men and women in terms of his categories in Eros and
Civilization in which the conception of the feminine is associ-
ated with the traits he ascribes to the new sensibility while the
masculine is associated with the traits of the Western ego and
rationality of domination which Marcuse long criticized, thus
anticipating "differencefeminism" which would also valorize the
feminine and maternal against the masculine.5
In this article, which generated significant debate, Marcuse ar-
gues that "feminine" values and qualities represent a determinate
negation of the values of capitalism, patriarchy, and the perfor-
mance principle. In his view, "socialism, as a qualitatively differ-
ent society, must embody the antithesis, the definite negation of
aggressive and repressiveneeds and values of capitalism as a form
of male-dominated culture" (M&F 285). Furthermore:
Formulated asthe antithesis of the dominating mascu-
line qualities, such feminine qualities would be receptivity,
sensitivity, non-violence, tenderness and so on. These char-
acteristics appear indeed as opposite of domination and ex-
ploitation. On the primary psychological level, they would
pertain to the domain of Eros, they would express the en-
ergy of the life instincts, against the death instinct and de-
structive energy (M&F 285-286). .
Marcuse was, however, criticized by women within the feminist
movement and others for essentializing gender difference, al-
though he insisted the distinction was a historical product of
Western society and not an essential gender difference. Women,
he argued, possess a "feminine" nature qualitatively different from
men because they have been frequently freed from repression in
the work place, brutality in the military, and competition in the
public sphere. Hence, they developed characteristics which for
Marcuse are the marks of an emancipated humanity. He summa-
rizes the difference between aggressive masculine and capitalist
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sive productivity" and "creative receptivity," suggesting that in-
creased emancipation of feminine qualities in the established so-
ciety" will subvert the dominant masculine values and the capi-
talist performance principle.
During the same decade, Marcuse also worked with Rudolf
Bahro's conception of "surplus consciousness" arguing that just
as Bahro argued that in the socialist countries a new conscious-
ness was developing which could see the discrepancy between
"what is" and "what could be" and was not satisfied with it's way
of life, so too was such oppositional consciousness developing in
the advanced capitalist countries. The argument is that
through the increasing mechanization and intellectualiza-
tion of labor , [there] accumulates an increasing quantity of
general ability, skills, knowledge, a human potencial which
cannot be developed within the established apparatus of
production, becauseit would conflict with the need for full-
time de-humanized labor. A large part of it is channelled
into unnecessarywork, unnecessary in that it isnot required
for the construction and preservation of a better society
but is necessitated only by the requirements of a capitalist
production.
Under these circumstances, a ~counter-consciousness'
emergesamong the dependent population (today about 90%
of the total?), an awareness of the ever more blatant obso-
lescence of the established social division and organization
of work. Rudolf Bahro, the militant East German dissident
(he was immediately jailed after the publication, in West
Germany, of his book The Alternative) uses the term sur-
plus-consciousness to designate this (still largely vague and
diffused) awareness. He defines it as "the growing quantity
of free mental energy which is no longer tied up in neces-
sary labor and hierarchical knowledge."!
"Surplus consciousness" in the Bahro-Marcuse conception is a
product of expanding education, scientific and technical devel-
opment, and refinement of the forces of production and labor
process that at once produce a higher form of consciousness and
yet do not satisfy in the labor process or everyday life the needs
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and ideals produced by contemporary society itself. In effect,
Bahro and Marcuse are arguing that critical consciousness is pro-
duced by the very social processes of the technological society
and that this subjectivity comes into conflict with existing hier-
archy, waste, repression, and domination, generating the need
for social change. This position maintains that existing social
processes themselves are helping produce a subjectivity that de-
mands participation and fulfillment in the labor process and socio-
political life, as well as increased freedom, equality, opportuni-
ties for advancement and development. If these needs are not
satisfied, Bahro and Marcuse suggest, rebellion and social trans-
formation will be generated.
I will offer some criticisms of Marcuse's concept of the revolu-
tionary subject in the concluding section, but want to note here
that counter to his caricature as an idealist utopian, Marcuse at-
tempted to ground his conception of radical subjectivity in exist-
ing struggles, movements, and tendencies. Hence, subjectivity
for Marcuse, whether the dominated subject of advanced capital-
ism or oppositional subjectivity which he sought in first the New
Left and counterculture and then new social movements, was
historical, evolving and developing, and was always full of con-
tradictions and ambiguities. Marcuse was more aware than most
in the Marxian tradition of the need for a robust theory of sub-
jectivity to generate the subjective conditions for change and he
was deeply interested in theory, culture, and social experience
which would help create a new subjectivity. Hence, his attempts
to reconstruct subjectivity are grounded in his political desire
for radical social change and preservation of the individual.
Some Concluding Comments
In retrospect, the critique of the subject launched by the Frank-
furt School, feminism, poststructuralism, postmodern theory, and
others have enriched our thinking on subjectivity by challeng-
ing us to rethink the problematics of the subject and agency, and
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have helped us think through and conceptualize various dimen-
sions of experience and action neglected in traditional accounts,
as well as to envisage alternative possibilities for thought, action,
and everyday life. While traditional and modern conceptions of
the subject were excessively rationalist, essentialist, idealist, and
metaphysical, I have argued that the contemporary critiques of
the subject provide the impetus and occasion to develop more
critical and creative conceptions of post-metaphysical subjectiv-
ity.
Hence, in conclusion, I would like to make some comments con-
trasting Habermasian perspectives on subjectivity with Marcusean
ones to indicate the specific contributions and strengths, and limi-
tations, of Marcuse's position. I have suggested that Marcuse of-
fers a notion of a corporeal subjectivity with an emphasis on its
aesthetic and erotic dimensions, while Habermas's communica-
tive reason lacks a body, grounding in nature and materiality,
and the aesthetic and erotic components. That is, while
Habermas's conception of subjectivity contains a grounding in
sociality and ego-alter relations, he does not offer a notion of
aesthetic, erotic, and embodied and sensual subjectivity as in
Marcuse's conception. There is also not as strong a critique of
the tendencies toward conformity and normalization as in
Marcuse's conception, nor is there as forceful a notion of trans-
formation and emancipation. Nor does Habermas offer a notion
of revolutionary subjectivity.
There are, on the other hand, problems with Marcuse's concep-
tions of subjectivity. I have downplayed the extent of Marcuse's
dependence on questionable aspects of Freud's instinct theory
because I believe that a Marcusean conception of subjectivity
can be produced without dependence on Freud's conception of
the political economy of the instincts, the death instinct, and the
somewhat biologistic notion of Eros that Marcuse draws from
Freud. Yet while Marcuse's focus on the corporeal, aesthetic,
erotic, and political dimensions of subjectivity constitutes a posi-
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tive legacy, there are omissions and deficiencies in his account.
Crucially, he underemphasizes the ethical and arguably, concern-
ing the political, does not adequately develop notions of justice
and democracy. Since notions of ethical, just, and democratic
subjectivity are not cultivated in Marcuse's writings, Habermas's
analyses provide a necessary complement. Habermas's primary
focus on the ego-alter relation and his subsequent treatises on
morals and moral development, democracy and law, and the so-
cial obligations and constraints on subjectivity offer an impor-
tant correction to Marcuse's analyses. Hence, both perspectives
on subjectivity by themselves are one-sided and require supple-
mentation by the other.
While I have been primarily concerned in this paper to interro-
gate Marcuse's resources for the rethinking and reconstruction
of subjectivity, I would argue that no one thinker has the answer
to the question and that we would thus be well advised to draw
upon a wealth of thinkers to rehabilitate and reconstruct subjec-
tivity in the contemporary moment. Within the Frankfurt
School, Adorno, Benjamin, Fromm, Habermas, Marcuse, and
others make important contributions and outside of the tradi-
tion many feminist theorists, poststructuralists, and others also
advance the project.' Moreover, there are also difficulties with
Marcuse's theory of the revolutionary subject that we must con-
front in concluding our remarks.
Despite his sharp critique and modification of orthodox Marx-
ism, Marcuse's theory is still too tied up with the Hegelian-Marx-
ian problematic of the "revolutionary subject" which presupposes
a unitary revolutionary class as the subject of revolution." In this
concept, the features explicated by Marx in his early analysis of
the proletariat are ascribed to whatever group, class or tendency
which the revolutionary theorist believes is the key to the revo-
lution. This concept reached its logical conclusion - and reduc-
tio ad absurdum - in Lukacs' notion of the proletariat as the
identical subject-object of history." Lukacs' contrived construe-
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tion and the subsequent critique that it elicited should have shown
the dangers of a Hegelian-Marxian concept of the revolutionary
subject and the need for another approach to revolutionary
theory.
Further reflection on the history and sociology of revolution
puts into question whether revolutionary transformation comes
from a "revolutionary subject" or rather, as I would argue, from
classes (or sectors of a class), groups, organizations, and individu-
als in struggle. It seems idealist and obtuse to ascribe revolution-
ary change to a (or to the) revolutionary subject since social change
comes from complex conjunctures and alliances between differ-
ent social groups and forces. Consequently, it is wrong to iden-
tify in advance the "revolutionary subject" with any particular
social class, group, or tendency. Indeed, it is extremely difficult
to specify in advance, especially in advanced capitalist societies,
"revolutionary forces." As Marcuse puts it: "The social agents of
revolution - and this is orthodox Marx - are formed only in
the process of the transformation itself, and one cannot count
on a situation in wliich the revolutionary forces are there ready-
made, so to speak, when the revolutionary movements begins"
(5L 64).
In this conception, the role of revolutionary theory is to analyze
existing social forces and groups in struggle in specific historical
conditions and situations, and to indicate which groups are bear-
ers of emancipatory interests, values, and sensibility and moti-
vated to generate radical social change. Hence, while I question
whether there is a "revolutionary subject" defined as a universal
revolutionary class, I do think it is important to specify the na-
ture and conditions of revolutionary subjectivity, defined as a
subjectivity which demands revolutionary change and which
prefigures alternative institutions, values and practices which will
create a better life for all. The strength of Marcuse's type of criti-
cal Marxism is its stress on the subjective conditions of (and ob-





to the given society. This subjective and speculative perspective
is a necessary component of the revolutionary project that struc-
turalist Marxism and poststructuralism - both of which reject
notions of revolutionary subjectivity -lack. Radical socialchange
requires taking seriously existing consciousness, criticizing mys-
tifications and distortions, and formulating needs,valuesand ideals
which will aid in the process of human liberation.
Although Marcuse sharply polemicizes against identification of
the revolutionary subject with Marx's proletariat, he does not
question the concept of the "revolutionary subject" itself. In-
deed, his protracted search for a revolutionary subject was the
source of his pessimism in One-Dimensional Man and then his
excessive reliance on students, intellectuals, the new sensibility,
women, and finally "surplus consciousness" as revolutionary
agents. Further, the concept of the revolutionary subject is re-
sponsible for his tendency to dismiss working class struggles as
"non-revolutionary" because they do not meet the exalted crite-
rion of the "revolutionary subject." Thus, I conclude that the
concept of the "revolutionary subject" is a specter that has haunted
Marcuse's project from the beginning and that it should be exor-
cised in the interests of developing new concepts to describe the
conditions, prospects and goals of emancipatory social change.
Still Marcuse is to be lauded for his many provocative critiques
of the Marxian theory of revolution and for his sustained at-
tempts to develop new revolutionary perspectives adequate to
the social conditions of advanced capitalism. Of all the Marxists
of his generation, Marcuse perhaps went furthest in trying to
discover and theorize the subjective conditions of revolution and
to develop a theory of radical subjectivity. In so doing, he devel-
oped a powerful critique of the philosophical concept of the sub-
ject and an alternative conception of subjectivity. While some of
his formulations were too imbricated in Freud's instinct theory
and the Marxian problematic of the revolutionary subject, I have
argued that there are other aspects of Marcuse's thought that
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avoid such formulations and that he provides many important
contributions to our understanding of subjectivity and agency
while challenging us to further rethink the problematics of sub-
jectivity in relation to the socio-economic developments and
political struggles of our own turbulent period. In this way, the
contemporary critiques of the subject challenge us to come up
with better conceptions and to develop new resources far criti-
cal theory and practice.
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Helmut Schelsky (1912-19~4) is certainly one of the most
importantandinfluential Germansociologists ofthepostwar-
period. He heldprofessorial chairs in sociology in the Federal
Republic for thirty tears (1948-1978): in Hamburg, Munster,
Bielefeld and, again, Munster. Owing to the lack of
translations Schelsky is, however, not very wellknown in the
English-speaking world. It's also difficult to point out one or
two principal writings from his hand; rather we have to do
with a continuous stream ofpublications on a wide range of
topics. 1 In this article, however, I'll focus on Schelsky's
controversialpostdoctoral thesis on Thomas Hobbes, whichhe
presented ontheeveoftheSecond WorldWar. Mydiscussion is
furthermore intended as a contribution to the much wider
theme: German intellectuals and NationalSocialism.
I.
In February 1939 Schelsky defended his postdoctoral thesis in
philosophy and sociology on Hobbes at the University of
Konigsberg. It was planned and prepared to appear as a book in
1942, but due to war circumstances it never did. Not until a few
years before his death did Schelsky decide to publish the
manuscript in an unchanged form. It appeared in 1981 under the
title Thomas Hobbes. Einepolitische Lebre?
In a new preface Schelsky quite openly states that at the time of
writing and rewriting his thesis (1938-1940) he was in no wayan
